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JUVENILE DETENTION LAW IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
Milton "Tony" Lee, John Copacino & Paul Holland
INTRODUCTION

On each and every day of the year (excluding Sundays), children are presented
for an initial hearing in the Family Division, Juvenile Branch of the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia. Because of unusually broad and often
misapplied preventive detention laws, children charged with property offenses such
as theft, or status offenses such as truancy and ungovernability, are subject to
detention for an indefinite period of time through summary procedures which do
not adequately ensure the reliability of the detention decision.
Because the detention of juveniles has become routine in superior court, its
potential harm to the child is often easy to ignore. The child is deprived of liberty
and of the home and family support system he or she has known.' The injurious
consequences of this confinement, such as stigmatization, negative self-labeling,
and institutionalization have been well noted. 2 In addition, detention increases the
likelihood that the child will be committed if found delinquent. 3 Given these grave
consequences, detention should be used sparingly, and imposed through procedures
which ensure the decision to detain will be a considered and reliable one.

1. See. e.g.. In re M., 473 P.2d 737, 747 n.25 (Cal. 1970):
It is difficult for an adult who has not been through the experience to realize the terror that engulfs a
youngster the first time he loses his liberty and has to spend the night or several days or %ecks in a
cold, impersonal cell or room away from home or family.... The experience tells the youngster that
he is "no good" and that society has rejected him. So he responds to society's expectation, sees
himself as delinquent, and acts like one.
Id.
2. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253. 291 (1984) (Marshall, J.. joined by Brennan and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting); United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1355 (D.C. 1981) (Ferren. J., concurring in part.
dissenting in part) (noting the greater likelihood of conviction of incarcerated defendants, due to conditions of
confinement which "are so harsh or intolerable as to induce [the defendant) to plead guilty, or that damage
his appearance or mental alertness at trial"). Many other cases have noted the impediment to the accused's
ability to participate in the investigation and planning of their case when detained pretrial. See Campbl v.
McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 532-33 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussion of "disturbing evidence" that a defendant "at
liberty pending trial stands a better chance of not being convicted or, if convicted, of not receiing a prison
sentence").
3. See, e.g., Stevens H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch. Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control.and Do
Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAw & Soc'y REV. 263, 304-06 (1980) (concluding that. after controlling
the effects of the present offense and prior record, the commitment rate remains much greater for children
held in detention).
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This Article will examine the District of Columbia preventive detention statute
and its application to the children appearing in Juvenile Court. Intended as an aid
to counsel practicing in Juvenile Court, this Article will describe the operation of
the preventive detention law, highlight important issues in the detention process,
and consider the viability of constitutional attacks upon the statute.

I.

A.

PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The Procedure

When a child in the District is arrested, and neither the police nor Social
Services decide to release the child to a parent or guardian after application of
District of Columbia Superior Court Juvenile Rule 106, the child must be brought
to court for a detention hearing by the end of the next day (excluding Sundays).'
At the detention hearing, the court must choose one of the following options for
determining the child's placement:5
(1) Release to a parent, guardian or other custodian who promises to bring
the child to future court hearings; 6
(2) Placement in the Home Detention Program, wherein the child resides in
the home of a parent or other guardian (as in (1)), but where the child's
compliance with the court-ordered curfew and other conditions is
monitored by a representative of the Social Services Division;'
(3) Placement in a shelter home, i.e., a home in the community staffed by
the Youth Services Administration, typically housing from eight to
twelve youths awaiting further court proceedings;8
4. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(a)(1) (1989 Repl.).
5. Id. § 16-2312(d)(1). The release or detention of a child is the only matter which must be decided at
the initial hearing. "[A]ny other part of the hearing (including the filing of a petition)" may be postponed for
up to five days, for good cause shown. Id. § 16-2312(g).
6. Id. § 16-2312(d)(2)(A). The court may order that a child so released comply with any conditions
"reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the child at the factfinding hearing or [the child's]
protection from harm." Id. § 16-2312(d)(2)(C). In practice, some of the most commonly imposed conditions
of this type include a curfew, school attendance, drug-testing, and staying away from the scene of the alleged
offense, the complaining witness, and any alleged co-perpetrators.
7. Id. § 16-2312(d)(2)(A).
8. D.C CODE ANN. § 16-2310(d)(1)(A) (1989 Repl.). Prior to placing a child in shelter care, the court
must find that the child is either a danger to him or herself or that there is no parent, guardian, custodian, or
other person or agency available to provide care and supervision, that the child is unable to care for him or
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Placement in secure detention;'

(5) Referral to the Youth Services Administration Screening Team to
choose from among all or some of the above options.
The detention hearing usually begins right after the child has been arraigned on
the charges (if a petition has been filed). A representative of Social Services
provides the court with a recommendation as to release or detention, as well as the
information which formed the basis of this recommendation." The Social Services
worker will generally provide the court with a wide range of information, including
home and school adjustment, drug and alcohol use, and any prior contacts with the
juvenile justice system."
Having received Social Services's recommendation, the court will usually turn to
counsel for the government and then to counsel for the child to hear their
respective positions. It is not uncommon for the court to ask the child's parent (or
other family members present) either for additional information or for an opinion
as to what the court should do regarding placement or conditions of release. Before
the court can order detention or shelter care, it must first conduct a hearing to

determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the allegation in the
petition is true."2 If there is no probable cause to believe that the child committed

the offense alleged or that an offense actually occurred, the child must be
13
released.

herself, and that no other resources are available to the family to safeguard the child without remo".al. Id.
§ 16-2310(b). As a result, there is no requirement for a showing that a child is a danger to the parsn or
property of others.
9. Id. § 16-2310(a). At present, Oak Hill Youth Center is the only secure facility op-rating as a
detention center for youths charged as juveniles in the District of Columbia.
10. Before the amended Juvenile Rules went into effect on August 1. 1995, Rule 102(f) proided that
statements by the respondent and his or her parents during the intake interview %ere not admissible for any
purpose at any hearing prior to the disposition hearing. New Rule 102(c) makes clear that such statcmcnts by
a respondent are inadmissible only at a subsequent fact-finding hearing or criminal trial based on the
allegations in the juvenile complaint. While statements made by parents are not excluded from use at a factfinding hearing, use of such statements continues to present significant hearsay problems.
11. It is arguable that the Social Services worker's inclusion of prior arrests %hich did not result in an
adjudication is objectionable because Rule 106, which specifies the criteria for detention. dos not specify such
prior charges. This argument is less persuasive now that the Rule has been amended to make clear that the
specified criteria do not provide the exclusive basis on which the judicial officer is to make the detention
decision.
12. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(e)-(f) (1989 Repl.).
13. Id. § 16-2312(f).
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B.

Detention: Legal Standards and Issues

District law presumes that a child charged as a juvenile will be released.1 4 The
court can only order detention if such a restriction on the child's liberty is required
to protect the person or property of others or of the child or to secure the child's

presence at the next court hearing. 15 The statute permits no other reason for
detention (e.g., "to teach the child a lesson")."6
Section 16-2310(b) authorizes detention of a much different type. This section
permits the use of "shelter care" placement for the protection of the child, or
"because the child has no parent, guardian, custodian, or other person or agency
able to provide supervision and care for [the child] .

. . ."

By statute and rule,

District law makes a clear distinction between "shelter care" and "detention."
Shelter care is defined as "temporary care of a child in physically unrestricting
facilities.' 7 Detention is defined as "temporary, secure custody."' 8 Detention may
be ordered when necessary to protect the person or property of others or of the

child, or to secure the child's appearance at future hearings.' 9
Shelter care may only be ordered to protect the person of the child or because
there is no adult able to provide supervision and care for the child, the child is
unable to care for him or herself, and there are no resources or arrangements that
20
would enable the family to safely care for the child.
Superior Court Juvenile Rule 106 is similarly divided into two sections
discussing the relevant factors for courts to consider in deciding whether to order a

14. Sections 16-2310(a) and (b) state in relevant part: "A child shall not be placed in detention prior to
a factfinding hearing or a dispositional hearing unless he is alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision
and unless it appears from the available information that detention is required ....
" D.C. CODE ANN. § 162310(a)-(b) (1989 Repl.).
15. Id. § 16-2310(a).
16. Id. § 16-23 10(b). When a judge considers removal of a child from home, the court must "secure for
[the child] custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been
provided for [the child] by [the] parents." D.C. SUPER. Cr. Juv. R. 2. Rarely, if ever, does the court have the
resources that would even begin to satisfy this mandate. Nonetheless, judges consistently ignore this mandate
and place children in facilities that neither provide care nor supervision consistent with Rule 2. One concrete
example of this type of abuse appears where children determined to be eligible for special education are placed
in secure detention. Oak Hill presently has no certified special education instructors and routinely fails to
implement individual educational plans as mandated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
17. D.C. CODE. ANN. § 16-2301(14) (1989 Repl.).
18. Id.§ 16-2301(13).
19. Id.§ 16-2310(a).
20. Id.§ 16-2310(b).
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child into either type of care. Sections 16-2310(a) and (b) both recognize
protection of the child as a ground for court-ordered placement outside the home.
Rule 106(a) makes clear, however, that detention is only justified when the need to
protect the child arises from behavior of the child (e.g., narcotics addiction,
alcoholism, suicidal actions). Shelter care is the only permissible out-of-home
placement when the need to protect the child arises from the acts or inactions of
others (e.g., abusive or threatening conduct toward the child by family, dangerous
conduct toward the child by others from whom the parents are unable to protect
the child, or the inadequacy of existing living arrangements). 2 ' Rule 106(b)(3)
categorically prohibits the placement of children in secure detention who need
shelter care.
The clear distinction between detention and shelter care within the statute and
the Rule is not evident within the actual workings of the District's juvenile justice
system. The Youth Services Administration operates one secure institution, Oak
Hill Youth Center, and a number of shelter houses. Many children subject to
detention under Section 16-2310(a) and Rule 106(a) are placed in shelter houses,
either directly by the court or later by the Youth Services Administration
Screening Team. These shelter houses are the only facilities in which youths in
shelter care may be housed. Thus, there is no difference in the residence or the
daily living situation of a youth detained at a shelter house and a youth placed in
shelter care.
However, the difference between the status of the two remains very important.
When a child residing in a shelter house seeks reconsideration of his or her status
under Rule 107, the justification for placing the child there will no doubt be
critical.2" For example, if the child was placed in shelter care because of abusive
conduct from an individual who has since been incarcerated, the basis for
removing the child from the home would no longer exist. Such a child must be
allowed to return home. It is unlikely that such a simple change in circumstances
would require the return home of a child who had exhibited narcotics addiction or
suicidal actions. It is incumbent upon counsel to ensure that the judicial officer
does not use the need for shelter care as a basis for an order for secure detention.
Counsel practicing in Juvenile Court must be familiar with several issues
concerning the application of Rule 106. First, as amended, the Rule explicitly

21. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(b) (as amended, Aug. 1. 1995).
22. Rule 107(c) provides that the "judicial officer ordering the release of a respondent . ma) at any
time amend the order to impose additional or different conditions of release." D C SutPER CT Jtuv R 107(c)
(as amended, Aug. 1, 1995).
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invites judicial officers to base detention decisions on factors not specifically
enumerated in the Rule. Such unchannelled discretion may in some cases render
the Rule unconstitutional.
On August 1, 1995, the amendments to Rule 106 took effect.2 3 One of the more
important of these amendments is the addition of an explicit statement that the
criteria in the Rule are not the exclusive basis for the judicial officer's detention
decision.2 As a result, factors which the former Rule arguably excluded, such as
truancy, can now be used as a basis for detention. In addition, the amended Rule
106(a)(3) rather substantially expanded the criteria for detention to protect the
child. The factors now deemed "relevant" include:
(i) Narcotics addiction by respondent or other indication of illegal drug
use,

(ii)

Abuse of alcohol by the respondent,

(iii)

Suicidal actions or tendencies of the respondent, and

(iv)

Other seriously self-destructive behavior creating an imminent danger
to the respondent's life or health.2"

The pre-amendment rule allowed detention only for "severe and chronic drug
abuse" and "severe and chronic alcoholism," actions which put the respondent at
grave risk of either imminent or long-term harm. By changing the criteria to
include any "indication of illegal drug use," a single positive drug test now may be
a permissible basis for detention, irrespective of the length of use, any indication of
the severity of the respondent's drug problem, or treatment alternatives available
in the community. What was arguably improper and irrelevant information under
the prior Rule will likely be a staple of every initial hearing where detention is
seriously considered. Preventive detention premised on such grounds as school
attendance or a single positive drug test raises strong due process concerns. 20
Counsel should be prepared to raise this challenge at the initial hearing.
A second issue concerns the applicability of factors in one part of the Rule to
detention decisions based on a different part of the Rule. Rule 106(a) contains
different lists of the factors which are relevant 27 to each of the different reasons for
23. 123 Daily Wash. L. Reptr. 1465, 1472 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1995).
24. The Rule now states that the "relevant factors include but are not limited to" the criteria in the
Rule. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(a)(3).
25. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(a)(3)(i)-(iv) (as amended, Aug. 1, 1995) (emphasis added).
26. See discussion infra section II B.
27. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2310(c) (1989 Repl.).
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detention: to protect the person of others, to protect the property of others from
serious loss or damage, to protect the respondent's own person, or to secure the
respondent's presence at the next court hearing. 28 Accordingly, the factors relevant
to determining whether detention is required to protect the person of others are not
the same as those relevant to determining whether detention is required to protect
the property of others, or to protect the child, or to secure the child's presence at
the next hearing. 29 The very act of separating the relevant factors under the
sections relating to the different purposes of detention would be unnecessary if any
factor, listed or otherwise, could be considered. For example, the record of the
child's previous offenses against persons are relevant to whether or not detention is
necessary to protect the person of others, but not the property of others. The
court's determination to detain must be for a specific statutory purpose and must
be supported by factors which are relevant to that purpose. Defense counsel should
argue that where none of the factors relevant to a particular detention purpose
exists, the child cannot be detained for that purpose.
Third, the Rule continues to make an important and prominent distinction
between the instant case (and any other pending cases), which are termed
"charges" and any prior adjudications, which are termed "offenses." 30 Because the
child has neither admitted guilt nor been found guilty in any pending cases, those
cases involve merely allegations, or charges. Any prior case resulting in a finding
of guilt is properly denoted as an offense. This distinction would be rendered
meaningless if the Rule were read to also permit the court to base a detention
decision on prior "charges" which have been dismissed without a finding of guilt.
Accordingly, counsel should argue that the child's prior record of arrests should
28. D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106 (a)(l)-(4) (as amended, Aug. 1. 1995).
29. For example, the factors relevant to determining whether detention is necessary to protect the
person of others include:
(i) Record of the respondent's previous offenses against persons.
(ii) Record of the respondent's previous weapons offenses.
(iii) Nature and circumstances of the pending charge,
(iv) Nature and circumstances of other pending charges, if the) involve an offense against the
person or a weapons offense,
(v) Allegations of danger or threats to witnesses, and
(vi) Emotional character and mental condition of the respondent.
D.C. SUPER CT. Juv. R. 106(a)(l)(i)-(vi) (as amended, Aug. 1,1995). "'The nature and circumstances of the
pending charge" is the only factor which appears on more than one list. Itis deemed relevant to determining
whether detention is necessary to protect the person or property of others.
30. See. e.g., D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 106(a)(l), which lists among the criteria for detention to protect
the person of others "the respondent's previous offenses against persons," the "[nlature and circumstances of
the pending charge," and the "[n]ature and circumstances of other pending charges." Id-(emphasis added).
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not be considered in the detention decision.31
Finally, perhaps the only limitation that may remain from pre-amendment days
is the issue whether a child may be detained where the only factor indicating the
need for detention is the "nature and circumstances of the pending charge." This
remains one of the factors listed in Rule 106(a)(1), as relevant to detention to
protect the person of others, and Rule 106(a)(2), as relevant to detention to
protect the property of others.
The court of appeals has spoken, albeit cryptically, on this issue in In re M.L.
DeJ.35 In M.L. Del., the court faced a challenge to a detention order of a youth
charged with carnal knowledge and assault. While the record on this expedited
appeal was incomplete, the child's counsel asserted that the court below ordered
detention to protect the person of others "based solely on 'the nature and
circumstances of the pending charge.' ,,a3 The court of appeals observed that
[s]tanding alone, this would not constitute sufficient grounds for detention."' 4 The
court added that the record before it contained "no indication that anything other
than the 'nature and circumstances of the pending charge' was considered
below." 35 Consequently, the court remanded the case to the lower court to file a
statement of reasons for the detention.
Whether the court meant that detention could never be justified by the nature
and circumstances of the pending charge alone, or that detention was not proper
unless the record indicated that all of the factors deemed relevant have been
considered by the court, has remained unclear. On three different occasions,
superior court judges have issued written opinions taking the view that detention
may be legally ordered based solely on the nature and circumstances of the
pending charge, provided that the court has considered all the relevant factors
listed in Rule 106.36 While reaching that conclusion, Judge Schwelb acknowledged
that the section of In re M.L. Del. previously paraphrased, "appears . . . to
support" the position that the nature and circumstances of the pending charge,
31. While the amended Rule 106 explicitly states that the relevant factors include but are not limited to
the listed criteria, the structure of the Rule suggests that prior arrests continue to be irrelevant. By explicitly
specifying pending charges as relevant, the Rule should continue to be read as implicitly excluding prior
charges that did not result in adjudication.
32.

310 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1973).

33. Id. at 836.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. In re M.R., 117 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1121 (D.C. Super..Ct. June 1, 1989); In re C.R.S., 109 Daily
Wash. L. Rptr. 309 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 1981); In re Michael M., 108 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1613 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 1980).
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without more, could never justify detention a7 Likewise, in C.R.S., Judge Schwelb
initially ordered detention based solely on the nature and circumstances of the
crime charged. In a Memorandum Opinion, the court of appeals set aside that
order and remanded the case to the lower court to consider what conditions of
release would be appropriate. Judge Schwelb recognized that the court of appeals
had not remanded the case for a more complete statement of reasons but rather
for a determination of appropriate conditions of release. Nevertheless, in his
written opinion, Judge Schwelb stated that this ruling should not be taken to mean
that detention based solely on the nature and circumstances of the charge would
never be proper, but instead should be interpreted as requiring well articulated
"compelling reasons," before the court can do so.a8 This conclusion, however,
ignores the fact that when the court of appeals wanted reasons in M.L. DeJ. it
remanded the case and asked for them. In reaching this conclusion, it is hard to
see why if "compelling reasons" are what the court wanted in C.R.S., it did not
ask for them.
The court of appeals has not addressed this issue in a published opinion since
M.L. DeJ. Judge Schwelb's remark in C.R.S. that the issue is "in some confusion
and disarray" is undoubtedly accurate.an However, in light of the language of M.L
DeJ., and the absence from District law of other safeguards which would make
detention based solely on those grounds constitutionally permissible, the legality of
detention based solely on the nature and circumstances of the pending charge is
questionable.
Detention is not permitted unless one of the statutory grounds exists. Nor is
detention required simply because the facts before the court show that it would be
permitted. Rule 106(a)(5) expressly states that release under appropriate
conditions remains an option in all cases.' Defense counsel must show the court
that appropriate supervision can be provided without detaining the child.
Where detention has been ordered, counsel for respondent should consider filing
41
a motion to reconsider or reduce the level of detention pursuant to Rule 107(c).

37. Michael M., 108 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. at 1617.
38. C.R.S., 109 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. at 313.
39. Id.
40. Rule 106(a)(f) provides that "[i]f detention appears justified ... the person making the decision
may nevertheless consider ... the respondent's living arrangements and degree of sur~rvision." D C SuPM
Cr. Juv. R. 106(a)(f) (as amended, Aug. 1. 1995).
41. Rule 107(c) states in relevant part:
A respondent who has been placed in detention, shelter care, or released under conditions pursuant to
D.C. Code §16-2312, or the Corporation Counsel, may, at any time thereafter upon wrinen
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The Rule permits counsel for respondent to petition the judicial officer ordering
detention to reduce a child's level of detention, or to amend the previously imposed
conditions of release, where a child has been released to community supervision.
Rule 107(c) remains an effective and underutilized tool for defense attorneys
seeking modification of condition of release or for the reduction of the level of
detention. Counsel should demonstrate to the court how information which was not
available at the time of the detention hearing supports the requested change.

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL ATrACK ON THE DISTRICr'S JUVENILE PREVENTIVE DETENTION

LAWS
Under the District's detention law, a child may be detained pending further
court hearings for an indefinite period of time for any offense. In addition, the law
requires no finding of prior involvement with the court system. Moreover, the
detention decision may be based on evidence introduced at the initial court
appearance which shows merely probable cause to believe the child has committed
an offense. The statute and rules are silent on the standard of proof required for
the detention decision. The low standard of proof, and the absence of any limits on
the length of detention or the offenses for which a child may be detained, render
the District's detention scheme subject to constitutional challenge.42 While the
Supreme Court has ruled that a statutory scheme authorizing the preventive
detention of juveniles may be constitutional, Schall v. Martin,43 it has never
addressed the constitutionality of detaining anyone, juvenile or adult, under a
scheme similar to the District's detention statute.
A.

Preventive Detention Law
Preventive detention has been an accepted and common feature of the juvenile

application to the Family Division, have the order reviewed by the judicial officer who entered the
order.
D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 107(c) (as amended, Aug. 1, 1995). As amended, D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R. 47-1(d)
vests the calendar judge with the authority to rule on such motions, or to certify them to another judicial
officer where appropriate.
42. For additional discussion on the appropriate standard of proof for detention decisions, see Julia
Colton-Bell & Robert J. Levant, Clear and Convincing Evidence: The Standard Required to Support Pretrial
Detention of Juveniles Pursuant to D.C. Code Section 2310, 3 D.C. L. REv. 213 (1995).
43.

467 U.S. 253 (1984).
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justice system since its inception. 44 Virtually every state juvenile statutory scheme
has explicitly provided for detention where the court concludes that the child poses
a danger to commit a new crime if released.4 5 It was in this context that the
Supreme Court first addressed the issue of preventive detention in Schall v.
Martin. The Schall majority used a two-step analysis to uphold the New York
juvenile preventive detention statute. First, the Court considered whether
preventive detention served a legitimate state interest.' 0 Second, the Court
addressed whether the statute's procedural safeguards were adequate to justify the
7
pretrial detention "of at least some" accused juveniles.'
The Schall majority easily concluded that the statute served legitimate state
interests. The Court noted the "legitimate and compelling state interest" of
protecting the community from crime.48 On the other hand, the Court concluded
that the juvenile's liberty interests were diminished by two factors: 1) unlike
adults, juveniles are "always in some form of custody";0 and 2) the state has an
equally valid interest in protecting the juvenile from the consequences of his or her
criminal activity-which include physical injury and the "downward spiral of
criminal activity into which peer pressure may lead the child."60 The Court
concluded that the legitimacy of these interests was confirmed by the widespread
use of preventive detention in the states.
The Court also decided that the preventive detention under the statute served a
non-punitive purpose. The Court based this conclusion on 1) the absence of any
indication of such a purpose in the statute; 2) the fact that detention is "strictly
limited in time" under the statute;05 and 3) the conditions of confinement, which it

44. See D. FREED & P. WALD. BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES 1964 at 93-109.
45. Id. See also Schall, 467 U.S. at 267 n.16 (collecting state statutes).
46. Schall, 467 U.S. at 263-64.
47. Id. at 264.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 265. The Court observed that the juvenile's interests may be subordinated to the Stte's
parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child." Id.(quoting Santasky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)). The dissent vigorously disputed the majorit)'s conclusion that detention is
the equivalent to the custody of a parent who has the child's best interests at heart. Id. at 289-90. The opinion
noted that secure detention entails incarceration in a facility closely resembling a jail. %%here assaults arc
common. Other commentators have noted that a much higher percentage of juveniles are detained preadjudication than post-adjudication, where they are exposed to conditions and associations which foster
delinquency. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedurefor the Juvenile
Court, 69 MINN. L. REv. 141, 201 (1984).

50. Schall, 467 U.S. at 266.
51. Id. at 269.
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found reflected a regulatory purpose."
In its discussion of the second factor, the Court noted that under the statute, the
maximum possible detention of a juvenile accused of a serious crime was 17
days, 5 3 and the maximum possible detention for a less serious crime was 6 days.
The Court emphasized that "[t]hese time frames seem suited to the limited
purpose of providing the youth with a controlled environment and separating him
from improper influences pending the speedy disposition of his case."
The Court then considered whether New York's procedures afforded juveniles
sufficient protection against erroneous and unnecessary deprivations of liberty. The
Court found that the requirements of notice, counsel, a hearing, a statement of
facts and reasons for detention, and a probable cause hearing were sufficient to
satisfy detention under the Fourth Amendment in Gerstein v. Pugh,' and were
therefore adequate in this context.55 In reaching this decision, the Court
specifically rejected the assertion that the statute was constitutionally inadequate
because it did not specify the factors on which the Family Court judge should rely
in making the detention decision, 5 the crimes for which detention was

52. Id. at 270-71. In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Court found that preventive
detention for adults in the criminal system served a regulatory purpose. In making that decision, the Court
looked to legislative intent and whether one can rationally assign a regulatory purpose to preventive detention.
Id. at 747. For a criticism of this analysis, see Marc Miller & Marty Guggenheim, PretrialDetention and
Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REv. 335, 364-73 (1990) (concluding preventive detention is no less punitive simply
because retribution does not appear to be its purpose and proposing test based on the intent and power of the
punisher and the effect on the individual being punished).
53. Schall, 467 U.S. at 270 (citing Family Court Act, New York Jud. Law § 320.5(3)(b) (MeKinney
1983).
54. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Gerstein held that the Constitution requires a judicial determination of
probable cause before extended post-arrest restraints on liberty because prolonged detention entails a Fourth
Amendment seizure of the person. The Court concluded, however, that such a probable cause determination
need not occur in an adversarial hearing. Id. at 120-21.
55. 467 U.S. at 277. The dissent strongly argued that these procedures are rudimentary in nature and
provide little guarantee of accuracy. Id. at 283-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 279. The Court stated:
Given the right to a hearing, to counsel, and to a statement of reasons, there is no reason that the
specific factors upon which the Family Court judge might rely must be specified in the statute. As
the New York Court of Appeals concluded, "to a very real extent Family Court must exercise a
substitute parental control for which there can be no particularized criteria."
Id. (citations omitted).
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authorized,5' or a more exacting standard of proof than probable cause. 8
Three years after Schall, in United States v. Salerno,"" the Supreme Court
rejected a facial attack on the constitutionality of the provisions of the federal Bail
Reform Act which authorized the preventive detention of adults charged with
certain serious crimes. Among the factors which the Court cited in support of the
validity of the statute were:
(1) that detention was only available in the case of individuals charged with
"the most serious crimes; ' 0
(2) that before ordering preventive detention the court must find by clear
and convincing evidence that there are no conditions of release which
would assure the safety of the community; 1
(3) that "the judicial officer is not given unbridled discretion in making the
detention determination. Congress has specified the considerations
relevant to that decision;"62

(4)

that "the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the
stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act."0 3

In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the Court noted that the
qualitative difference between the liberty interests of adults and juveniles is
relevant to determining whether the legislation is "regulatory" or "punitive." The
Salerno Court noted that Schall upheld a preventive detention statute which
permitted detention of any juvenile accused of any crime." The Court indicated
that the greater liberty interests of adults require a more carefully tailored

57. Id. at 269 n.18. The Court concluded that the discretion to limit crimes subject to detention resided
with the legislature, and that any attack on such a ground would have to made on a case by case basis. Id.
The Court also noted that "there is no indication that delimiting the category of crimes justifying detention
would improve the accuracy of the [detention] determination in any respect." Id. at 277 n.29.
58. There are, of course, arguments that the Court's evaluation of this criterion %as flawed. While such
an analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, it merits brief mention here. Studies of children in detention
have shown that the majority of juveniles who are preventively detained are not charged with serious offenses.
See, e.g., Feld, supra note 49, at 199. Accordingly, as the dissenting opinion in Schall noted, prevention of the
minor offenses that these juveniles may commit yields little benefit to the public and great cost to the juvenile.
See Schall, 467 U.S. at 297 (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
59. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
60. Id. at 747.
61. Id. at 750.
62. Id. at 742.
63. Id. at 747.
64. Salerno, 484 U.S. at 750.
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statute,65 and it emphasized that the Bail Reform Act was much narrower than
the Family Court Act at issue in Schall.66
The District of Columbia statute authorizing the preventive detention of adults
provides these same safeguards and more. 67 Only individuals charged with a crime
of violence, a dangerous crime, obstruction of justice, or a crime involving a serious
risk of obstruction of justice or threats to witnesses may be detained.6 8 The judge
must find that there is a substantial probability that the accused committed the
offense charged. 69 This standard is considerably higher than probable cause.7
Finally, the judge must also find by clear and convincing evidence that there is no
condition or combination of conditions of release which would assure the safety of
the community."
These procedural protections are far more substantial than the protections
afforded juveniles in the District. While courts have consistently held that juvenile
proceedings are fundamentally different from adult criminal trials as a result of
the "parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the
child,"'7 2 there remains no doubt that the Due Process Clause requires that certain
basic constitutional protections afforded to adults accused of crimes also be
afforded to juveniles.7 The Due Process balance has consistently been struck
toward providing for the "informality" and "flexibility" that characterizes juvenile
proceedings while ensuring that such proceedings comport with the fundamental
7
fairness that the Due Process Clause demands.

B.

The Application of Detention Law to Juvenile Court in the District of
Columbia

Schall v. Martin imposes a major obstacle to a challenge to the facial
constitutionality of the District's juvenile preventive detention scheme. In

65. Id. at 750-51.
66. Id.
67. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1989 Repl.).
68. Id. § 23-1322(a)(1)-(3).
69. Id. § 23-1322(b)(2)(c).
70. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1329 (D.C. 1981) (en bane).
71. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b)(2)(A) (1989 Repl.).
72. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
73. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 37-57 (1967) (notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege
against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-examination); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
74. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
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confronting a facial challenge, a court could declare the statute unconstitutional
only if there is no conceivable set of circumstances under which the statute would
be valid.7 5 With one notable exception, the District's scheme provides either the
same or greater protections than the New York Family Court Act. Each scheme
provides for the procedural protections of notice, counsel, a hearing, a statement of
facts and reasons for detention, and a probable cause determination. Indeed, the
District's Rule 106 goes further than the New York Statute in that it enumerates
the criteria by which the court should make its detention decision. The Schall
Court upheld a statutory scheme which gave the decision maker no guidance. The
recent amendments to Rule 106, however, allow the court to consider factors
which are not listed in the Rule and which loosen the criteria for detention in some
instances. But in light of Schall, this distinction should not affect the facial
constitutionality of the scheme. Moreover, neither scheme limits detention to a
narrowed class of serious offenses,76 and neither requires a showing greater than
probable cause to believe that the respondent committed the instant offense.
One notable difference from the Family Court Act construed in Schall is that
the District scheme imposes no limit on the duration of the detention. Indeed, in
one recent case the court of appeals approved a 213-day detention, while declining
under the circumstances to address the constitutional challenge. 7 7 Finding that the
New York statute served a regulatory and not a punitive purpose, the Schall
Court emphasized that the statute "strictly limited" the time of detention.7 8
Therefore, the absence of a time limit in the District scheme arguably renders the
detention punitive. This argument is bolstered by the fact that relatively short time
limits exist in juvenile court statutes and rules across the country. At present, 33
states have strict limits on the amount of time that a juvenile may spend in
detention prior to trial. In 2 of those states, Louisiana7 0 and Massachusetts, 0

75.

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 740-45.

76. Several states strictly limit the offenses for which juveniles may be detained prior to trial. Florida
has recently changed its law to require release before a court hearing unless the child is alleged to have
committed a serious crime and shows certain other risk factors. See. e.g.. FLA ST A,.%. § 39.044 (West
1995). Despite this trend, Schall's approval of a scheme which has no limits on the crime %ould seem to
foreclose this argument.
77.

In re K.H., 647 A.2d 61 (D.C.

1994). While the court found the length of the detention

"troublesome," the court did not reverse the detention order because 1) much of the delay was due to the
juveniles attorney's illness on an earlier trial date; 2) the juvenile did not file an appeal from his February IS
detention until August 1I; and 3) the juvenile was recently detained in another case, so a decision in this case
would have "a strong advisory element, since it is unlikely it would lead to his release in any event." Id. at 63.
78. Schall, 467 U.S. at 269.
79. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 821(E) (West 1995). The comment to this section states that "[i]n
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preventive detention of juveniles is not permitted. Juveniles in those states are
either released or held on bond. Those unable to make bond are entitled to have
their cases tried within 15 days in Massachusetts81 and 30 days in Louisiana. 2 In
23 other states, detained juveniles are entitled to trial within thirty 30 days of
detention. In some states, the remedy for failure to comply with these time limits is
release;8 3 in others it is dismissal of the charges.84 Of the 17 states which do not
have strict time limits, more than half have some authority for controlling the
length of detention. Several states that do not have strict limits on detention
require that judges review the cases of all detained youths to determine if
detention remains necessary. 85 In contrast, District law is utterly silent on limiting
the length of pretrial detention. At present, it is unlikely that a juvenile detained in
the District would even have a trial scheduled within 60 days of detention, which
exceeds the maximum detention limit in the vast majority of states. Upon a factual
demonstration that the vast majority of juveniles are regularly detained for
substantially more than 60 days, a court may find that the detention is punitive,
rather than regulatory, and that the statute therefore violates due process.
An additional omission from the District's statute that may raise constitutional
concerns is the absence of any evidentiary standard of proof regulating the

defining the court's options as release or bail, it eliminates the possibility of holding a child in so-called
preventive detention."
80. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119 § 68 (Law. Co-op 1975).
81. Id. § 68. Standing Order 1-88 of the Juvenile Court requires that all adjudications for juveniles
detained on bond take place within twenty-one days. It is unclear whether this order simply provides an outer
limit for any continuances granted under § 68, or if the order supplants the statutory limit.
82. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 877 (West 1995).
83. See, e.g., ILL REV. STAT. ch. 705 para. 405/5-14(B)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 316-7-6(g) (1992 Repl.); MD. Juv. CT. R. 914(b)(2).
84. See ARIZ. Juv. CT. R. 6.1(j); CAL. JUV. CT. R. 1485(d); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 877(C) (West
1995); N.M. CHILD. CT. R. 10-226(e); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-24 (1991 Repl.).
85. In Hawaii, for example, a detention order cannot last longer than seven days, but may be extended
in seven day increments. HAW. FAM. CT. R. 135 and 136. In Iowa, a new hearing is required if the seven day
detention order lapses without a trial being held. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.44(7) (West 1994). In the District,
a detained child may move to have the order of detention reconsidered. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. 107(c) (as
amended, Aug. 1, 1995). A system which forces detention to terminate in the absence of judicial action plainly
expresses a stronger preference for release and provides greater protection for children's liberty interests than
one which allows detention to endure absent judicial action following a motion.
Another means of limiting pretrial detention of juveniles exists in Alabama, where the Alabama Supreme
Court has issued the following guidelines for its juvenile courts: within 30 days, 50% of all detained juveniles
will have had their cases tried. By 60 days, 75%, by 90 days, 90%, and by 120 days, 100. While these
guidelines do not create any substantive rights, they do set a standard which the trial courts no doubt strive to
match.
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determination of whether detention is necessary under the statutory criteria.
Before any type of detention may be ordered the court must find that probable
cause exists regarding the allegation in the petition. 86 While the court of appeals
has not addressed this precise issue in the juvenile context, the court has dealt
extensively with the issue in the adult or criminal branch of the court. The court,
citing Salerno, has consistently held that the clear and convincing evidence
standard must be applied anytime the government seeks preventive detention based
on dangerousness."' The court later determined that the very same standard of
clear and convincing evidence must be applied when detention is based upon risk
of flight. 88
Even if the absence of a detention time limit or a statutory standard of proof
does not render the statutory scheme facially unconstitutional, it is an important
factor which, combined with other case-specific factors, may render the detention
unconstitutional as applied. In individual litigation under the due process clause,
the juvenile is not faced with meeting the daunting standard of a facial challenge
(i.e., showing that there is no conceivable set of circumstances under which the
statute would be valid). Indeed, in rejecting the facial challenge in Schall, the
Court specifically pointed to the availability of individual litigation to correct on a
case-by-case basis "any erroneous detentions."89
In addition to factors conducive to challenging the length of detention,00 factors
which may render the detention subject to challenge include: a relatively minor
crime for which the child is detained; 9 ' a record of relatively minor offenses or
property offenses; episodic drug or alcohol use, rather than severe and chronic drug
addiction indicating an imminent danger to the child; and social factors which are
not directly related to danger or appearance, such as school attendance, curfew,
and obedience to parental rules. Because the state interest is protecting the
community and the child from serious harm, that interest is severely diminished
where the predicted harm is not significant.92 Similarly, reliance on factors not

86. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2312(0 (1989 Repl.); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 US. 103 (1975).
87. Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1989).
88. Kleinbart v. United States, 604 A.2d 861 (D.C. 1992).
89. Schall, 467 U.S. at 281.
90. Counsel need not wait until detention has become lengthy to challenge it. The fact that a trial date
has been set three or four months from the date of the hearing indicates that. absent unusual circumstances,
detention will continue for that period of time.
91. The Schall majority specifically mentioned this factor as one which should be litigated on a case-bycase basis. 467 U.S. at 269 n.18.
92. See supra note 49.
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directly related to dangerousness renders the court's decision unreliable. Despite
persuasive evidence, the Court in Schall rejected the juvenile's assertion that
predictions of dangerousness are always unreliable.93 Nevertheless, there is a
strong argument that due process is offended by such a prediction in an individual
case when such predictions of dangerousness are based on irrelevant factors.

CONCLUSION

The recent amendments to the District's detention criteria have expanded what
was already a very sweeping detention scheme. By deleting "factors that shall be
deemed relevant" and inserting "factors which include but are not limited to," one
can expect that this expansion in the detention criteria will result in an increase in
the already large number of juveniles detained pending trial.
The legal analysis and policy rationale in this Article for limiting impermissible
and inappropriate juvenile detention should be utilized by counsel when litigating
on behalf of their juvenile clients. Counsel should seek to ensure that juvenile
proceedings comport with the requirements of due process and respect the liberty
interests of their juvenile clients.

93.

Schall, 467 U.S. at 278-79.

